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Tucker: “Shadows and Whispers”

Major MX. Tucker, Officer Commanding
23 Canadian Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers

J

n September 1944 the 23rd Canadian Field
Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, was
attached to 43rd (Wessex) Division of British
30 Corps. It was to support that division's
proposed assault across the Rhine to relieve
1st British Airborne Division in the Arnhem
bridgehead.

On the morning of 25 September, Major
M.L. Tucker, the officer commanding the 23rd
Field Company, was called to an Orders Group.
The decision to evacuate the remaining
airborne troops had been made and Major
Tucker was told the Canadians should use
their stormboatsfor the operation. They were
given no additional resources for carrying, offloading Or assisting the men evacuated,
presumably because no one believed that large
numbers of men could be rescued.
Major
Tucker and Lieutenant R.S. Kennedy went
forward to recce the area and subsequently
Lieutenant Kennedy and Lieutenant Tate
located two sites northeast of Driel where
stormboats could be launched.
Fourteen stormboats and 1 7 Evinrude
outboard motors were available and 10 Field
Park Company provided 12 fitters and
equipment repairers who proved invaluable.
Major Tucker was told that Oosterbeek
Church, directly across the river from the
launching site, was the centre of the airborne
bridgehead. The first stormboat was to be on
the north side of the river by 2140 that night.
Major Tucker's account of that incredible
night was written on 30 September 1944.

Memorial erected in honour of the Canadian operation
to rescue British paratroopers near Arnhem.
Photo by L. Copp
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ieutenant Kennedy was put in charge of
the off-loading of vehicles and the carrying
of stormboats to launching sites, about 500
yards ahead. Lieutenants Martin and Cronyn
were delegated to clear and tape routes for
moving the stormboats from off-loading points
to launching sites. Subsequently Lieutenant
Martin was detailed to proceed to the far bank
to determine the situation there and
Lieutenant Cronyn was placed in charge of
the beach on our side of the river. This beach
had two bays, one on the western end, about
20 yards wide, and one on the eastern end
about 60 yards wide. The two were separated
by a groin built out of rock and projecting
about 30 yards out into the river. The small
bay was used for the launching of boats and
the wider one and the groin as operating
bases for the craft. Lieutenant Tate was
slated to assist Lieutenant Kennedy and to
supervise the setting up of advance petrol
dumps and Regimental Aid Post.

Two flood walls blocked the path from the
off-loading area to the launching sites. The
first of these was about 20 feet high with
banks sloping to about 45 degrees, the second
one was about half the height and the slope of
the b a n k was much less severe. These
obstacles became most difficult to negotiate.
The heavy rain softened the ground and the
churning of men's feet as they struggled over
with stormboats soon created a slippery mess
which lent no footing whatsoever. Hand
ropes were fixed, but even with these the
going was extremely difficult.
The first boat was launched at 2130 hours,
but it had been badly holed when the men
carrying slipped coming down the side of the
floodwall and the stream of water which
poured into it would have sunk it before it
could have completed a crossing. The next
boat was launched at 2145 hours and set off
with Lieutenant Martin in command. This
boat did not return and neither Lieutenant
Martin nor any member of the crew has been
seen or heard from since. Two witnesses
report having seen it break apart and sink as
the result of a direct mortar hit. They cannot
be positive of this, however, as visibility was
very bad. Corporal McLachlan captained the
3rd boat to be launched and soon returned
bearing the first load of Airborne troops to be

evacuated by us. He continued and completed
15 trips before he was relieved by a fresh
crew. The fourth boat, in charge of Corporal
S.F. Smith, was launched twenty minutes
later, at 2235 hours. This boat made its way
safely to the bridgehead, but swamped when
a mortar fell close by on the return voyage.
Corporal Smith, although not a swimmer,
floated back on his open greatcoat to the far
side. Four of his passengers also got back,
but all other occupants of the boat appear to
have been lost.
Succeeding boats were
launched at intervals of about 20 minutes
and all 14 boats were in the water by 0330
hours. None of these boats were sunk in the
channel, but several of them were eventually
holed by enemy fire or submerged obstacles
and had to be abandoned on reaching shore.
An enemy mortar was observed firing from
directly opposite the launch site during the
time that the first four boats were being
launched but was not seen afterwards, so
that it is presumed that our troops in the
bridgehead must have cleared it up.
The night was intensely dark, but fires
started by our bombers in the afternoon and
the numerous flares sent up by the enemy
m u s t have revealed a great deal of our
movement to him. These fires helped us
greatly too, since they provided beacons by
which our boat crews could direct their craft.
Intermittent burst of Bren were fired across
to mark the limits of our beach boundaries,
but in view of the fact that the fires provided
stationary and constant light the crews did
not resort to observation of the incendiary
bursts from the Brens.
Heavy rain was
accompanied by a bitter wind which made
things most unpleasant, but the bad weather
was probably less to the liking of the enemy
than it was to us and most surely have
resulted in our having had less casualties
than should have done had the night been
clear and fine. The rain cause the Evinrude
motors to give endless trouble and was
responsible for their failing altogether in many
cases. Something must be done to protect
the electric circuits of these motors if they are
to be continued to be used for such purposes.
E. & M. personnel and our own fitters worked
ceaselessly to keep the motors in running
order, but they could never keep up to the
breakdowns.
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Inscription on plaque marking the
site of the rescue operation.

There was a great deal of enemy fire during
the night. Machine guns set on fixed lines
swept the river and beaches on both sides.
Fortunately most of the fire was high, at least
it was on the operating site on the South side
of the river. When daylight came the machine
guns up on the hill above the bridgehead
rained a murderous hail of bullets on those
craft which were still operating, but the
downward angle of the fire was much less
effective than it would have been had the
guns been in position to make more horizontal
sweeps.
Mortar a n d 88 mm fire fell
everywhere. Many casualties were reported
from the bridgehead, but on the river and on
the South bank they were light. Three men
were wounded in the off-loading area and one
between there and the beach. Enemy snipers
were also active and it was reported that
some of the Airborne troops spotted the
positions of two of them in crossing the river
and proceeded to liquidate them when they
reached the South shore.
It was Jound impossible to keep complete
records of the crossings made and the
passengers carried. Paper turned to pulp in
the driving rain. There was no point, either,
from which a picture of what was going on
along the whole beach could be seen and in
many cases passengers were landed well
outside the limits of the beach when stalled
motors had allowed craft to stray off line. It
was impossible to regulate the number of
passengers carried in boats at times. Men
panicked and stormed onto the boats, in
some cases capsizing them. In many cases
they had to be beaten off or threatened with
shooting to avoid having the boats swamped.
With the approach of dawn this condition
became worse. They were afraid that daylight
would force us to cease our ferrying before
they could be rescued. The maximum lift at
one time was 36. All of these men were
packed into his boat by Lieutenant Kennedy
on his last trip, the last trip made by anyone
in this operation. The minimum lift was 6. A
corporal operating a boat which was leaking

They Were Just Shadows
and Wispers in the Night
It is 25th September 1944 the battle of
Arnhem is still raging, but the position of
the surrounded British and Polish Airborne
troops on the northern Rhine bank has
become untenable.
Then the orderfor their evacuation across
the river is given. In that rainy night
hundreds of soldiers come in small parties
to the river forelands, between the
farmhouse and the Old Church . . . and
wait to be rescued. Under heavy German
fire from the Westerbouwing, British (260
and 553Fd Coys) and Canadian (20 and
23Fd Coy) Engineers make dozens of
trips in their small boats from this bank. In
one night, supported by other units, they
manage to rescue 2,400 Airborne troops.
At the time the rescued had hardly seen
their savers, so they have never been
able to thank them. This monument has
been erected to express their gratitude.
(15th September 1989)
badly decided he could make one more trip
and bring off a few men before his craft went
down. It sunk as he approached the South
shore, but fortunately the water was shallow
at this point and they were all able to wade
a s h o r e safely.
It is estimated t h a t
approximately 150 boatloads were brought
back by the stormboat crews and t h a t
approximately the average load carried was
about 16 passengers. Thus approximately
2400 to 2500 troops were brought off.
No forward facilities were provided for the
care of wounded, beyond what was available
in the FAP's set up by 260 Field Company and
this Company. Many of the rescued men were
wounded and our own RAP dressed 69
stretcher cases as well as attending to over
100 walking wounded. Greatcoats and other
clothing were used to improvise stretchers
and were given to men who were in desperate
need of cover from the elements. Caring for
all these casualties proved a great drain on
the man power of the Company and prevented
adequate reliefs for the boat carrying parties
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and boat crews. RAMC facilities were available
in the rear of our off-loading area, but these
were only designed to cope with casualties
which it was expected might arise from within
the personnel of the two field companies
employed in the operation.
The work of all personnel employed in this
operation was of a very high standard, but
there were those who rose beyond that level.
Lieutenant Kennedy, in addition to making a
recce, planning the operation and supervising
the off-loading and delivering the stormboats
to the launching sites, took command of a
boat when these tasks were completed and
brought off 125 men from the bridgehead
under very trying conditions which prevailed
with the advent of daylight. Corporal Robinson
did a tremendous nights work. With his
section he constructed a bridge by which
access was made possible to the orchard
which was used as our off-loading area. With
the arrival of the bridging lorries, he took
charge of a party and was responsible for the
safe and prompt delivery of many stormboats
to the launching sites. On delivering the last
boat, he took command of it and complete 6
t r i p s before t h e b o a t was p u t o u t of
commission. All of the boat crews were
magnificent, and only gave up their ferrying
when their boats were no longer operable or
else when they were exhausted and had to be
ordered from the beach.
Of these Lance Corporals Albright and
G u n n e s s and Sappers LeBouthillier and
McCready were o u t s t a n d i n g .
H/Capt.
Mongeon, the R.C. Padre, came under fire for
the first time in his career and acquitted
himself nobly. In addition to the normal
duties of attending wounded and bringing
courage and cheer to the exhausted men, he
helped with the carrying of the stormboats,
carried petrol to the beach and seemed to
always be present where he was most needed.
The E & M personnel attached from the Field
Park Company rendered excellent service in
keeping the Evinrude motors running.

The casualties suffered by the Company
in this engagement were as follows :Lt. J.R. Martin
L/Cpl W.D. Ryan
S p r D.L.G. Hope
S p r H.C. M a g n u s s o n
Spr L.J. Roherty
S p r N.A. T h o m p s o n
Sgt D.E. B a r n e s
Spr D.E. Francis
Spr D.J. McCready
Spr R.T. McKee
Spr J . P . LeToqueux

Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing

&
&
&
&
&
&

p r e s u m e d KIA *
p r e s u m e d KIA
p r e s u m e d KIA
p r e s u m e d KIA
p r e s u m e d KIA
p r e s u m e d KIA
Wounded
Wounded
Wounded
Wounded
Wounded
Killed in Action

Commander Royal Engineers 43 Division
ordered cessation of operations at 0545 hours
when it became evident that any further
attempts to bring off men would be suicidal
for the boat crews.
The Company with a t t a c h e d troops
repaired to the off-loading area and embussed
for the advance harbour area at VALBURG.
Lieutenant Asper and his party had breakfast
ready and took care of the feeding of many of
the returned Airborne troops in addition to
our own personnel.
Lieutenant Cronyn was left behind in the
off-loading area to pick up and bring in any
stragglers who might come in after the main
body had moved off. He remained there until
1030 hours, but none of the above reported
missing came in and there was little chance of
anyone showing up until darkness fell again.
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